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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ARCHIE NIELSON and SYLVIA
W. NIELSON, hi s wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

)

TT

V•

C. A. RASMUSSEN, C. WESLEY
RASMUSSEN and BERNICE C.
RASMUSSEN, his wife,
Case No. 14,376
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.

)
)

-

BERT CARTER and BLANCH G. CARTER,
his wife,
Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents.

)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to impose a constructive trust
upon certain property purchased from the Appellants by the
third-party defendants. Appellants claim that the third-party
defendants agreed to hold four (4) building lots sold to them
in trust for the Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury on the 23rd and
24th day of September, 1975, before the Honorable J. Robert
-1-

Bullock.

The tiral court found in favor of the Defendants

Carter and against the Plaintiffs, no cause of action. The
Plaintiff objected to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law of the trial court and made a motion to make additional
findings and a motion for a new trial. On November 20, 1975,
the trial court denied Plaintiffs' objection and motions. The
Plaintiffs appeal the decision of the trial court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the Court affirm the rulings
of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents disagree with Appellants1 Statement of
Facts in the following particulars:
In January of 1966 Plaintiffs Nielsons brought
suit against the Rasmussens.

(R. 4-8)

In March or April of

1966 the Defendant Bert Carter started negotiating with the
Plaintiffs for the purchase of a part of their property
comprised of approximately 15 acres.

(Tr. 181, lines 3-9)

During the course of negotiations with the Plaintiffs, Defendant
Bert Carter had occasion to be near the property in April of
1966 with Wesley Rasmussen and discussed with him Rasmussen's
desire to acquire four (4) lots from the 15 acre plot.
181, lines 15-21)

(Tr.

On May 18, 1966, the Defendants Carters

purchased approximately 15 acres of ground from the Plaintiffs
as shown by Exhibits 1 and 2.
property was $19,100.

The purchase price for said

(Tr. 38, lines 21-30) Appellants1 State-

ment of Facts states that problems arose as to the description

of the property being transferred.
not supported by the evidence.

This statement of fact is

The documents Exhibit 1 and 2

show the full legal description of the property transferred to
the Defendants Carter by the Plaintiffs on May 18, 1966, both
contained in the purchase contract and in the Deed of Transfer.
The preliminary discussion with Rasmussens concerning the four
(4) lots was not included in the first contract of purchase.
(Exs. 1 & 2)
Appellants state that Defendants Carter induced the
Plaintiffs Nielson to transfer all of the property on the
promise that they would later transfer four (4) lots to the
Rasmussens.

This was not the finding of the trial court nor the

facts.

(R. 160; Tr. 122, lines 1216; Tr. 134, lines 3-12,

23-28)

The true facts are that Defendants Carter purchased

15 acres of ground from the Plaintiffs Nielson, with the
Plaintiffs Nielson retaining other parts of their property.
(Ex. 7) Defendant Bert Carter admits discussing the transfer of
lots with Raimussen as stated in Appellants' Statement of Facts,
but this was prior to Defendants Carter's purchase of the property
from the Plaintiffs.

Rasnussen only met with Plaintiffs Carter

on the property once and that was before the purchase from
Plaintiffs.

(Tr. 150, lines 8-9; Tr. 118, lines 10-14: Tr. 181,

lines 15-30; Tr. 150, lines 4-15)

Defendant Bert Carter knew

that Rasmussens were in a dispute over lots with the Plaintiffs
Nielson.

(Tr. 181, lines 22-30; Tr. 182, lines 1-21)

After

the purchase of the 15 acres by the Defendant Bert Carter in
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May, 1966, Rasmussens and Plaintiffs Nielson entered into a
settlement agreement on April 12, 196 7.

(Ex. 3)

Defendants

Carter were not present at the signing of the settlement agreement and did not have any knowledge of the negotiations or the
settlement agreement as testified to by the Plaintiff Archie
Nielson.

(Tr. 75, lines 22-24; Tr. 76, lines 5, 16-26)

In

January of 1974 Rasmussens answered the complaint of Plaintiffs
Nielson which had been filed in 1966 and also counterclaimed
against Plaintiffs Nielson.

Rasmussens further filed a third-

party complaint against Defendants Carter, which was dismissed
upon motion by the trial court.

(R. 24, 25 & 37)

On February

7, 1974, Plaintiffs answered Rasmussens1 counterclaim and filed
a complaint against Defendants Carter nearly eight years after
the contract for purchase and deed to Defendants Carter had
been executed and after Carter had taken possession of the
property and completed payment for the property.
Appellants' Statement of Facts sets forth allegations
that Defendants Carter participated in the settlement agreement
between Defendants Carter and Rasmussens.

This is contrary to the

facts found by the trial court and presented wherein Plaintiff
Archie Nielson admitted that Defendants Carter did not participate
or have knowledge of the settlement between Plaintiffs Nielson
and Rasmussens.

(Tr. 75-76).

At the time of the execution of the purchase agreement
by the Defendants from the Plaintiffs, the written agreement

-4-

comprised the entire agreement between the parties as testified
to by Plaintiffs Nielson as shown in the transcript (Tr. 29-30)
wherein the question was asked of Plaintiff Archie Nielson:
Q: Now was there any other agreement you had
with Mr. Carter at the time of the signing
of that agreement other than that he would
let Mr. Lewis see a copy of the agreement?
As

No

At the time of the signing of the purchase agreement the attorney
for Defendants, Mr. Hugh Vern Wentz, read the agreement to the
Plaintiffs and their daughter who was present/ in the presence
of Defendant Bert Carter.

(Tr. 165)

At that time no questions

were asked by the Plaintiffs1 daughter with regard to the alleged
four (4) lots to be transferred to Rasmussens.

This was an

arm's length transaction between parties who had had no prior
dealings.

Plaintiffs so testified.

(Tr. 26, lines 17-20; Tr.

52, lines 22-26) After the payments had been completed by the
Defendants Carter on May 5, 1972, the Plaintiffs entered in
their own handwriting "paid in full" on the purchase agreement
by which Defendants were making purchase of the property.

(Tr.

38, lines 21-30) Again at that time no question was raised by
the Plaintiffs regarding the alleged four (4) lots in any manner
whatsoever.

(Testimony of Sylvia Nielson, Tr. 96, lines 27-30;

Tr. 97, lines 1-3)
At the commencement of the lawsuit the Plaintiffs
filed a Lis Pendens covering all property of Defendants Carter
although they allegedly claimed only four (4) lots.
-5-

By stipulation

the parties released all but four (4) lots so as not to impose
a Lis Pendens beyond that which could have been affected by
any decision of the Court,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED BOTH ON THE LAW AND
UPON THE FACTS THAT THE COVEYANCE OF LAND TO DEFENDANTS,
CARTER, BY THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT IMPOSE A CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST,.
The law of this State requires that the creation of a
trust over real property must be based upon a written instrument
subscribed by the party creating the trust.

25-5-1, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended:
No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered
or declared otherwise than by act or operation
of law or by deed or conveyance in writing
subscribed by the party creating, granting^
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same,
or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
by writing. [emphasis supplied]
An exception to such requirement exists where the law imposes
as an equitable remedy, a constructive trust.
To overturn the written instrument and establish the
constructive trust the burden of persuasion is upon the party
claiming the existence of the trust to establish such by clear
and convincing evidence.
As stated by this Court in Jewell v. Horner, (1961)
12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594, at page 333:

. . . the authorities are practically uniform to
the point that to justify a court in determining
from oral testimony that a deed which purports
to convey land absolutely in fee simple was
intended to be something different/ such as a
trust, such testimony must be clear and
convincing, [emphasis supplied]
The Court went on to cite with approval Chambers v.
Emery/ (1896)

13 Utah 374/ 45 P., 192f and the Court's statement

therein at page 392:
In such event the proof must be strong/ clear
and convincing/ such as to leave no doubt of
the existence of the trust. Such a case is
similar to one where it is attempted to convert
a deed absolute into a mortgage/ or where the
reformation of a written instrument is sought
on the ground of accident/ mistake, or fraud.
In all such cases the court will scrutinize
parol evidence with great caution/ and the
plaintiff must fail unless it is clear/ definite/
unequivocal/ and conclusive, [emphasis supplied]
In Paulsen, et al, v. Coombs/ et ux,# (1953)/ 123 Utah
49/ 253 P.2d 621/ at page 56 this Court said:
The question of whether evidence is sufficient
to be clear and convincing is primarily for
the trial court; his finding should not be
disturbed unless we must say as a matter of
law that no one could reasonably find the
evidence to be clear and convincing.
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts in Section 4 5
reads:
Where the owner of an interest in land transfers
Ttf inter vivos to another in trust for a thXrcT
person, but no memorandum properly evidencing the
intention to create a trust is signed/ as required
by the Statutes of Frauds, and the transferee refuses
to perform the trust/ the transferee holds the
interest upon a constructive trust for the third
person/ iff but only if/
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(a) the tranferee by fraud, duress or undue
influence prevented the transferor from creating
an enforceable interest in the third person, or
(b) the transferee at the time of the transfer
was in a confidential relation to the transferor, or
(c) the transfer was made by the transferor in
anticipation of death. [emphasis supplied]
This Court has cited with approval as the law in this
State the above section of the Law of Trusts in the determination
of the criteria for establishment of a constructive trust.
Haws v. Jensen, (1949) 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229.

Thus, in only

three circumstances will the Court impose constructive trusts
as an equitable remedy:

(a)

where the transferee obtained the

property by fraud, duress or undue influence; (b) where the
transferee was at the time of transferring in a confidential
relation with the transferor; and (c) where the transfer was
made in anticipation of death.

The evidence in the case now

before the Court clearly eliminates the claim of a transfer
obtained by fraud, duress or undue influence or a transfer made
in the anticipation of death.

The only criteria remaining now

on which Appellants rely is that the transferor and transferee
were in a confidential relationship.

This matter will be dealt

with more completely in Point II of this Brief.
In Peterson v. Peterson, (1943) 105 Utah 133, 141
P.2d 882, the transferee was the brother and as stated by the
Court at page 135:
—

~

The plaintiffs because of the fact that Charles
was their brother and because of their long deal-
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ings with him in the partnership relied upon said
representations and signed quit claim deeds to
Charles. [emphasis supplied]
Under such circusmtances the Court held the imposition
of the trust to contravene the deed, absolute on its face.
In Haws v. Jensen, supra., the transfer was between a
mother and daughter and the Court said at page 216:
Admittedly there is no writing evidencing
Mrs. Haws1 intention that the property
conveyed by her be held in trust by Amber.
In the case now before the Court, the usual circumstance
for establishing a constructive trust are not present; that is, a
transfer by deed without any further agreement evidencing the
intention of the transferor.

In this case there was not only

the deed transferring the property to the Defendants (Ex. 2),
but a contractual agreement spelling out the terms and conditions
of the transfer drawn by an attorney and executed by the parties
in the presence of their daughter and the attorney.

(Ex. 1)

The need for the essential element of the confidential relationship is further shown in Haws v. Jensen, supra., when the
Court said at page 217:
Thus this allegation along with the fact that
the grantor and grantee were mother and
daughter, which appears on the face of the
complaint, is a sufficient allegation of
a confidential relation. Scott on Trusts,
Vol. I, Sec. 44.2 states:
f

A constructive trust is imposed even
if there is no fiduciary relationship
such as that between attorney and client,
principal and agent, trustee and bene-
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ficiary; it is sufficient that there is
a family relationship or other personal
relationship of such a character that the
transferor is justified in believing that
the transferee will act in his interest,
[emphasis supplied]
In 1953# this Court found facts sufficient to impose a constructive
trust in Hawkins v. Perry/ et al., (1953), 123 Utah 16/ 254
P.2d 372/ when at page 24 it said:
At the time Hawkins gave Perry the money the
former was a boy of 16; he was acting under
the advice of Mr. Perry, who was an older man,
his relative, and a minister of the gospel.
These circumstances satisfy the requirement that
a confidential relationship exist as a foundation for the imposition of a constructive trust
as decreed by the trial court. [emphasis supplied]
In Jewell v. Horner, (1961)/ supra., this Court overturned a trial court finding of a constructive trust holding
that the evidence did not establish such trust by clear and
convincing evidence and distinguished Haws v. Jensen, supra.,
at page 334 by pointing out that in Haws there was no consideration
for the transfer and in Jewell there was a consideration paid for
the transfer.

In the case now at bar. Defendants Carter paid

$19/100 for the conveyance of the property pursuant to the terms
of the contract.

(Ex. 1)

Surrounding jurisdictions have held

to the same rulings as the Utah decisions.

The Oklahoma case

of Peyton v. McCaslin, (1966)/ 417 P.2d 316f and the Colorado
case of Austin v. Wysowatcky/ (1973)/ 511 P.2d 526.
In each of the Utah cases which have ruled that a
constructive trust existed, there has been a family# or other
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fiduciary relationship between the transferor and the transferee:
Peterson v. Peterson, supra., - transfer by family
members to their brother;
Haws v. Jensen, supra., - transfer by mother to
daughter;
Hawkins v. Perry, supra., - tranfer by youth to
advisor, his relative and minister; and in
Jewell v. Horner, supra., - transfer by father to
daughter, but trust was denied because consideration
was paid.
In the case now before the Court the Defendant Blanch
G. Carter never had any dealings with the Plaintiffs prior to
this litigation.

The Defendant Bert Carter was a purchaser of

property having no prior transactions or business relationship
or personal relationship with the Plaintiffs.
lines 17-20; Tr. 52, lines 22-26)

(Tr. 26,

The transaction was formulated

in a written agreement (Ex. 1 ) , coupled with a deed, (Ex. 2) and
a consideration was paid in the amount of $19,100.00 for the
purchase of the property.
The trial court never lost sight of the fact that in
this case an agreement was entered into between Plaintiffs
and Defendants on the 18th day of May, 1966.

(Ex. I)

That

by that agreement Defendants agreed to make payments of
$19,100 in annual installments of $3,000 to the Plaintiffs
for the purchase of the property.

That the agreement provided

for forfeiture of payments made in the event that the Defendants
did not complete their payments.

Defendants agreed further

to pay all taxes and assessments upon the property after the
date of the execution of the agreement and to keep all

insurable buildings and improvements on the premises insured in
a company acceptable to the Plaintiffs in an amount not less
than the value of the buildings.

The agreement further

provided that the Defendants of the property upon failure to pay
taxes, assessments or insurance premiums would be subject to
three-quarters of one percent per month interest on said sums
advanced by the Plaintiffs until repaid by the Defendants.
A further paragraph of significance in the transaction
is the paragraph on the third page of the agreement (Ex. 1)
which reads as follows:
It is hereby expressly understood and agreed
by the parties hereto that the Buyers accept
said property in its present condition, and
will require marketable title only to the
title description, but will acquire title to
all the land lying within the fence line it
being understood that the Buyers shall have
the right to perfect title in themselves
to all lands lying within the fence line.
These provisions in the agreement show the rights of the Defendants
to the property as their own and refutes any claim of trust by
such provision.

To construe under such provision of the agree-

ment that the Defendants were holding the property in trust for
other persons is inconceivable.

A further provision was included

in the agreement between the Defendants and Plaintiffs that in
the event of default by the Defendants (buyers) they subjected
themselves of the payment of attorney's fees from enforcing the
agreement.

This, too, refutes any claim of trust and verifies

the buyer-seller relationship.

This was an arm's-length buyer-

seller transaction clearly evidenced by the agreement and the

deed that transferred
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THERE WAS NOT A
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND
THE DEFENDANTS UPON WHICH A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST COULD
BE PREDICATED.
As stated in Appellants1 brief, the trial court
properly recognized that one of the preconditions for the imposition of a constructive trust is the

existence of a confidential

relationship between the parties which caused the grantor to
rely on the assurances of the grantee.

Although in this case

the trial court held that there was no representation or
agreement by the Defendants that they would hold the alleged
four (4) lots in trust, Plaintiffs' ostensible quotation from
the Haws case contained on page 12 of Appellants' brief is an
amalgamation of several quotes from the case taken out of
context without the intervening explanation. At page 217 of
the Haws case, supra., speaking through Justice Wolfe the court
quoted from Scott on Trusts, Vol I, Sec. 44.2 that a fiduciary
relationship is not necessary to establish a confidential relationship, that:
. . .it is sufficient that there is a family
relationship or other personal relationship
of such a character that the thransferor is
justified in believing that the transferee
will act in his interest. [emphasis supplied]
In the case now before the Court the Defendants were
negotiating for purchasing land from the Plaintiffs. This
was the first business dealings and first transactions between
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This brings us to the app^.. j.ia:~.-„f ::; ciain t'-iat.
the evidence discloses without, contradiction
that "a relationship of trus: and confidence
existed between Mrs. Luce and I Irs. Ampuero1.
No evidence whatever is pointed out to show
that such relati on beyond the fact that they
had been close friends since girlhood, had
corresponded, visited back and forth., and
Mrs. Ampuero considered the respondent the
most reliable friend she had. It is conceded
by respondent's counsel that Mrs. Ampuero had
confidence in Mrs. Luce. But that is not
to say that a confidential or fiduciary
relation, as those terms are used in the
authorities . . [authorities cited] . .
existed between them.
The Court there quoted from Brison v. Brison, 7 5 Ca 52 5,
J .

.. . . 1 :

It is not every case where parties trust
each other that the law recognizes as
confidential . Zunpuero y. Luce, et^ a 1 .,
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The cases are clear that where there is
some sort of a status between the grantor
and grantee, and confidence is imposed, a
constructive trust will be imposed upon
repudiation of the oral promise to reconvey.
Thus actual trust and confidence, plus the
relationship of parent and child, is sufficient.
and went on to cite many cases where the relationship was
essential to the imposition of the constructive trust.
In Peterson, supra., this Court further announced
when it cited from Scott on Trusts that there are numerous
cases to the effect that where at the time of the transfer the
transferee was in a confidential relationship to transferor and
the transferor relied on an oral promise to reconvey the land
the transferee is chargeable as constructive trustee of the land
for the transferor.

The trial court in this case did not

find that the transferee, Defendants Carter, made any such
oral promise to reconvey the land, and even if it had made such
finding, there is no showing that there was the confidential
relationship between the parties as contemplated by the Court in
the Peterson case.

The provision in the purchase agreement (Ex.

1) asserted by plaintiffs as the basis for establishing the
confidential relationship is more than offset by the further
provisions in the agreement requiring the (a) payment of
consideration; (b) subjecting them to liability of attorney's
fees in the event of default; (c) payment of taxes and insurance
premiums; and (d) the other provisions of the purchase agreement
imposing obligations upon the Defendants together with the fact
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Plaintiffs allege that the statements in the legal
documents, the lack of specificity, prior dealings of the parties
and agents and acts of Plaintiffs Archie and Sylvia Nielson all
clearly show that the relationship was one of trust and confidence.
The transcript shows quite the contrary.

Plaintiffs Archie and

Sylvia Nielson secured separate legal counsel to evaluate the
transaction,

(Tr. 28, lines 28-30; Tr. 29, line 1)

no prior dealings between the parties.

There were

The trial court's

conclusion that there was not a confidential relationship existing
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants is the only conclusion
the Court could make based upon the evidence presented to the
Court.
CONCLUSION
The trial court as the trier of the fact in this case
correctly concluded that Defendants did not enter into any oral
agreement to hold four (4) lots in trust for the Plaintiffs or
for the Rasmussens.

It correctly found that there was no

confidential relationship between the parties and no constructive
trust to be imposed by the Court.

The decision was fully in

line with all of the Utah decisions regarding constructive
trusts and the facts present in this case.
Respectfully submitted.

M. Dayle Jpffs
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